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1.  Introduction  
 
In order for an economy to function effectively, capital must be allocated to its truly most 
productive,  value-creating  end.  This  implies  that  capital  is  swiftly  (re)allocated  from 
sectors and firms with poor future prospects to those with high expected future returns. 
This process is termed the functional efficiency of capital markets
1 (Tobin, 1984) and has 
important implications for the overall performance and growth of the economy (Levine, 
1997).  As  a  fundamental  input  for  production,  the  mechanisms  through  which  firms 
access and manage capital are crucial for firm performance. When firms are incorporated, 
they are able to raise large amounts of capital but face problems of agency and incentives 
because control of assets is separated from ownership. The ability of capital markets to 
solve these problems ultimately affects the rate of economic growth
2. Investors must be 
able to overcome these problems and ensure a return on their investments. 
 
For this reason, an important component of the corporate governance literature addresses 
mechanisms through which agency and incentive problems may be overcome
3. Corporate 
governance  systems  include  formal  law,  such  as  securities  law,  regulatory  regimes, 
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1 Note that this term is different from the standard term market efficiency, which refers to how efficiently 
information  is  compounded into  share  prices.  The  term  functional  efficiency  refers  to  how  effectively 
capital  is  allocated  to  its  highest  value  use.  For  a  discussion  of  the  various  types  of  capital  market 
efficiencies see Tobin (1984). See also Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005).     
2 For example, Beck, Levine and Loaysa (2000) show that it is the type and nature of investments, rather 
than the overall level, that is important for growth. See also Levine (2004) for a review of the theoretical 
and empirical literature on how different capital markets allocate capital, handle information asymmetries, 
treat agency problems and affect growth.  
3 The implications of separating ownership from control were noted as early as Adam Smith, who observed 
that the “stewards of rich men,” i.e., managers, had other objectives than their “masters,” i.e., owners of 
corporations (1776). For more current reviews of the corporate governance literature, see Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), Denis and McConnell (2003) and Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2004a).   3 
banking structures and legal traditions (Söderström et al., 2003). The way such systems 
allocate  resources  among  stakeholders  affects  both  the  structure  and  composition  of 
ownership,  as  well  as  access  to  financial  capital.  This,  in  turn,  affects  investment 
decisions that ultimately have consequences for firm performance and economic growth.  
 
Recent  comparative  research  on  corporate  governance  suggests  that  distribution  of 
control over capital assets is a crucial determinant of the functional efficiency of capital 
markets. In particular, high ownership concentration (family control) under weak market 
institutions may favor the status quo, leading to economic entrenchment (Morck et al., 
2005). 
 
Economic  entrenchment  hinders  growth  for  at  least  two  related  reasons.  First,  high 
ownership concentration means that a few families can hold control of a large portion of 
the economy, which affects the immediate allocation of capital. For example, a new firm 
with no connection to a controlling family would be slow to receive capital tied up in 
firms controlled by the family, even if the existing firms perform poorly. Second, the 
process through which institutions become endogenous is affected by political power. 
This is relevant because economic control can translate into political influence (Morck et 
al., 2005; Pagano and Volpin, 2005), thus affecting institutions in the future. 
 
Research  on  corporate  governance  and  especially  ownership  is  motivated  by  the 
pervasive  agency  problem.  To  this  end,  we  advance  this  literature  by  clarifying  the 
relationship between ownership, basic market institutions and the allocation of capital. 
We analyze how the allocation of capital is affected by the concentration of corporate 
control in general and family ownership in particular, as well as the quality of corporate 
governance institutions. Although a wide range of corporate governance institutions exist, 
we refer primarily to the quality of property rights and investor protection in this paper. 
We  employ  an  accelerator  approach  to  derive  a  measure  of  the  efficiency  of  capital 
allocation: Elasticity of capital with respect to output (sales). Our method is similar to 
Wurgler (2000) but with the important difference that our approach is consistent with the   4 
accelerator principle, also referred to as the capital stock adjustment principle
4. We use a 
panel of about 12,000 firms over a minimum of five years across 44 countries.  
 
In  the  next  section,  we  discuss  how  corporate  governance  structures,  especially 
ownership, can lead to economic entrenchment.  In section three, we derive and discuss 
our  measure  of  the  functional  efficiency  of  capital  markets.  We  describe  the  data  in 
section four and present and analyze results in section five. In section six, we conclude 
and outline relevant policy implications for the allocation of capital. 
 
 
2.  Ownership and Economic Entrenchment 
 
In the seminal book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means 
(1932) describe the ownership structure of the corporation as diffused. They argue that 
dispersion of ownership shifts corporate control from owners to managers. As this occurs, 
managers become unaccountable to owners and gain incentives to cater to objectives 
other than shareholder value or profit maximization. This description of the corporation 
has  been  influential  in  motivating  a  large  literature  on  managerial  objectives
5.  Much 
research on corporate governance has focused on the behavior of managers with different 
incentives based on the extent of owner participation. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show 
that  dispersion  of  ownership  leads  to  diversion  of  interests.  At  the  firm  level,  more 
concentrated  ownership  provides  large  controlling  owners  with  incentives  to  monitor 
managers  and  exercise  control  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976).  DeMarzo  and  Urosevic 
(2006) note that if the stake of a large shareholder is high enough, they have the incentive 
to work, thereby performing what they consider the key social function of monitoring 
firm  activity.  From  this,  we  might  expect  a  positive  incentive  effect  of  ownership 
                                                 
4 Wurgler (2000) measures the functional efficiency of capital markets by calculating the elasticity of 
industry investments with respect to industry value-added. He shows that the elasticity of investments 
depends  on  financial  development.  As  we  focus  on  ownership  and  corporate  governance  issues,  the 
relationship between financial markets and capital allocation is beyond the scope of this paper. See Wurgler 
(2000) and Levine (2004) for more on this relationship.  
5 The literature on managerial objectives addresses the maximizing behavior of managers. This includes 
hypotheses on maximization behavior related to sales (Baumol 1959), staff and “on-the-job-consumption” 
(Williamson 1963) and firm growth (Marris 1964). See also Scitovsky (1943).   5 
concentration at the firm level. However, Stulz (1988) shows that as insider ownership 
concentration increases, the scope for controlling owners to exploit minority investors 
also increases. The ability of insiders to extract value from the corporation at the expense 
of  other  shareholders  is  referred  to  as  managerial  entrenchment,  or  simply  as  the 
entrenchment effect. 
 
The net effect therefore depends on the balance between the positive incentive effect and 
the negative entrenchment effect. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) provide empirical 
support  for  both  effects  by  finding  a  non-linear  relationship  between  ownership 
concentration and Tobin’s q. This is inconsistent, however, with the research of Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999). 
 
Despite  its  role  in  the  managerial  economics  literature,  the  widely  held  corporation 
described  by  Berle  and  Means  (1932)  is  largely  an  Anglo-Saxon  form  of  corporate 
organization. Few corporations across the world have dispersed ownership structure, even 
in developed countries. La Porta et al. (1999) find one large controlling (ultimate) owner 
for corporations across 27 developed economies, and Faccio and Lang (2000) find that 
family control dominates in continental Europe. Across countries, firms ranging in size 
are found to have controlling shareholders
6. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find 
extensive family control in the majority of East Asian corporations, where problems of 
agency are greatest
7. A growing literature shows that family control often is inferior to 
professional management (Morck, Strangeland and Yueng, 2000; Perez-Gonzales, 2001). 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) examine S&P 500 firms and find that family firms have a 
lower Tobin’s q than non-family firms.  
 
The  ability  of  these  controlling  shareholders  to  maintain  control  depends  on  the 
institutional  context  of  the  country.  Two  institutions  are  particularly  important  in 
explaining  cross  country  variation  in  ownership  concentration:  Property  rights  and 
                                                 
6 Most controlling shareholders belong to wealthy families (La Porta et al., 1999). Caprio et al. (2007) find 
a controlling shareholder, usually a wealthy family, for 75% of the ten largest banks in 44 countries. 
7 The authors find the ten largest families in the Philippines and Indonesia control of more than half of 
corporate assets – 52.5% in the Philippines and 57.7% in Indonesia. It is similarly high in Thailand and 
Hong Kong, at 46.2% and 32.1% respectively (Claessens et al., 2000).   6 
investor right protection
8. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that very high ownership 
concentration  may  simply  be  reflective  of  poor  investor  and  property  protection. 
Ownership concentration may substitute in institutional environments where investors are 
poorly protected (La Porta et al., 1998). Therefore, high ownership concentration can be 
an equilibrium outcome in the presence of a weak institutional environment. If formal 
property rights weaken or the protection of minority shareholders is further reduced, this 
would result in an upward shift in ownership concentration. In countries where small 
investors  are  insufficiently  protected,  only  large  owners  can  realistically  expect  any 
return on investments (La Porta et al., 1998). Further, weak institutional environments do 
not  adequately  protect  the  security  of  transactions,  which  can  create  disincentives  to 
exchange, and control-enhancing mechanisms such as control pyramids may simply be 
rational adaptations to poorly functioning markets (Morck et. al., 2005). Laws protecting 
shareholders  are  shown  to increase  firm  valuations  (La  Porta  et  al.,  2002)  and  small 
investors may prevent the expropriation of bank resources by large shareholders (Caprio, 
Laeven and Levine, 2007). Bebchuk (1999) shows that poor investor protection increases 
opportunities for extraction of private benefits and thereby renders dispersed ownership 
structures unstable.  
 
La Porta et al. (1998) examine ownership concentration across 49 countries and find a 
strong  negative  correlation  between  investor  protection  and  aggregate  ownership 
concentration.  They  conclude  that  in  countries  with  insufficient  legal  protection  of 
shareholders, small and diversified investors will be of minor importance. Further, they 
find that the quality of legal protection of investors differs systematically across countries 
of varying legal origin. Whereas Anglo-Saxon legal origin countries have the strongest 
protection,  German  and  Scandinavian  legal  origin  countries  assume  an  intermediate 
position and French-origin countries have the poorest protection of investors. Gurgler et 
al. (2004b) use the rankings by La Porta et al. (1998) across a sample of some 19,000 
companies  across  61  countries.  They  find  that  legal  origin  is  the  most  important 
                                                 
8 Legal protection of shareholders (outsiders) is associated with larger stock markets (La Porta et al., 1997), 
higher market-to-book values (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002) and higher dividend payout 
ratios (La Porta et al., 2000). See also Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002).          7 
determinant of return on investments and in fact, it dominates differences in ownership 
structure. 
 
Morck et al. (2005) argue that the diffused ownership of the Anglo-Saxon corporation is 
merely one possible end-point of capitalism. The other end-point is oligarchic capitalism, 
where  firms  are  controlled  by  a  few  families  through  various  control  enhancing 
mechanisms
9. The spectrum between these end-points comprises systems with more or 
less  concentrated  ownership.  Control-enhancing  mechanisms  allow  owners  to  control 
firms  without  maintaining  a  proportional  share  of  the  equity.  This  disproportionality 
between cash-flow rights and control rights alters the incentives of controlling owners, 
which reduces the incentive effect and enhances managerial entrenchment (Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002; Eklund, 2007). Eklund (2007) uses a measure of Tobin’s 
marginal q to show that vote-differentiation of shares significantly reduces the incentive 
effect  and  enhances  the  entrenchment  effect.  In  general,  firms  with  proportional 
ownership structures tend to invest efficiently whereas firms where control instruments 
separate cash-flow from control tend to over-invest.   
 
This can lead to economic entrenchment, whereby market forces are unable to operate. 
As  defined  by  Morck  et  al.  (2005),  economic  entrenchment  is  the  macro-economic 
counterpart
10 to firm-level managerial entrenchment (Stulz, 1988). This ultimately leads 
to  inefficient  allocation  of  resources,  stunted  entrepreneurship,  capital  market 
development and growth (Morck et al., 2005). Extensive use of control instruments may 
prevent capital from being reallocated to promising new ventures. For example, nascent 
entrepreneurs need credit but if capital cannot be released from its current activities, the 
economy  demonstrates  entrenchment
11.  Competition  and  the  process  of  creative 
destruction  are  curbed  in  entrenched  economies,  causing  persistent  misallocation  of 
                                                 
9 The most common control enhancing mechanisms are: Dual-class shares, pyramid ownership and cross 
holdings. Outside of Anglo-Saxon countries these mechanisms are very common.  
10 We use the term economic entrenchment in a broad sense. Morck et al. (2004) (the NBER version of 
their  2005  JEL  article)  define  economic  entrenchment  as:  “(…)  economy  as  exhibiting  economic 
entrenchment if it has a highly oligarchic flavor of capitalism and exhibits signs of enduring economic 
inefficiency.”  
11 See Schumpeter (1934) for an early analysis of the role of credit in economic development   8 
assets
12.  Morck  et  al.  (2005)  argue  that  family  ownership  in  the  presence  of  weak 
property rights and investor protection preserves status quo and lowers the functional 
efficiency of capital markets.  
  
In fact, a number of authors assume that weak property rights benefit corporate insiders 
and the controlling owner at all times (Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000; Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003). The allocation of capital is affected by the way in which formal property 
rights govern transactions and the transfer of assets. In this sense, formal property rights 
are a necessary precondition for low transaction costs. According to de Soto (2000), an 




Morck et al. (2005) identify three effects of changes in private property rights:  transferal 
effect, cost of capital effect and competition effect. First, if private property improves, 
wealth is transferred from the users of capital to its suppliers. Depending on the direction 
of change, wealth can be transferred between insiders and suppliers. Second, property 
rights affect the cost of capital. If private property rights weaken, the cost of capital for 
both insiders and entrepreneurs will increase. Finally, improvements in property rights 
will enhance competition. This depends on the cost of capital. If property rights improve 
and  the  cost  of  capital  is  therefore  reduced,  new  projects  become  viable  and  more 
entrepreneurs will enter the market
14.  
 
This survey of the literature indicates at least two important reasons for concentration of 
ownership.  At this firm level, large shareholders will have both the incentives and ability 
to  monitor  managers.  This  reduces  agency  costs.  At  the  country  level,  ownership 
concentration can substitute for poor investor protection and weak property rights. As 
these rights improve, the equilibrium level of ownership concentration is reduced. Based 
                                                 
12 Compare this with Mueller’s (1977) approach to assess the efficiency of the market system by examining 
the persistency of profits.   
13  de  Soto  notes:  “Formal  property’s  contribution  to  mankind  is  not  the  protection  of  ownership… 
Property’s real breakthrough is that it radically improved the flow of communications about assets and 
their potential. It also enhanced the status of their owners, who became economic agents able to transform 
assets within a broader network” (1990). 
14 For a discussion of these three effects on financial development, see Morck et al. (2005).   9 
on this primacy of corporate governance institutions in preventing or enabling economic 
entrenchment,  we  develop  the  following  primary  hypothesis:  Countries  with  high 
ownership  concentration,  in  combination  with  weak  property  rights  and  investor 
protection, will have poorer functional efficiency of capital markets. 
 
 
3.  The accelerator principle and capital stock adjustment   
 
Investments are defined as the flow of expenditure intended to maintain or increase the 
capital stock in a firm. If expected returns to firm capital decline, this implies that desired 
capital  stock  also  declines.  The  efficient  allocation  of  capital  requires  shifts  from 
industries and firms with poor prospects to more promising investment opportunities. In a 
perfectly competitive frictionless economy, capital will be efficiently allocated because 
investments  immediately  respond  to  changes  in  volume  and  quality  of  investment 
opportunities.  That  is:  Investments  will  be  made  at  the  point  where  marginal  return 
matches the real interest rate.  
 
Wurgler (2000) estimates the industry elasticity of investments with respect to industry 
value-added. Elasticity indicates the speed of capital reallocation and in effect, is a way to 
estimate the functional efficiency of capital allocation. We derive a measure built from 
Wurgler’s (2000) approach but with several important distinctions. 
 
We estimate the elasticity of capital with respect to output, using sales as the measure of 
output. Assuming constant prices, like Keynes, changes in sales will be proportional to 
changes in output.  We make the crucial assumption that changes in sales provide an 
approximation  for  future  sales  and  thus,  future  demand  for  capital  (investment 
opportunities). Ceteris paribus, higher elasticity of capital with respect to sales means a 
quicker  response  to  changes  in  future  expected  returns.  Therefore,  this  means  more 
efficient capital allocation.  
   10 
To capture the time structure of investments and responses to changes in expectations, we 
employ an accelerator model of investments. Several different proxies for output are used 
as  accelerators  in  the  literature
15.  Tinbergen  (1938;  1939)  suggests  that  investments 
depend  on  level  of  profits,  arguing  that  current  profits  are  good  predictors  of  future 
profits. Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) use gross value-added and Kuh (1963) use both 
retained earnings and sales. Our rationale for using sales rather than value-added is the 
inconsistency and unreliability of definition and data for measurements of firm value-
added across countries. The accounting data is simply not reliable enough to ensure a 
consistently defined value-added across countries
16. Further, profits would not be useful 
in this case because we expect profits to have asymmetric effects on investments across 
countries, depending on the extent of market frictions (Hubbard, 1998). If firms in one 
country  suffer  relatively  more  from  financial  constraints,  it  is  more  difficult  to  raise 
external funds and will, for example, reflect in greater sensitivity of investments with 
respect to profits (as compared to other countries).  
 
In accelerator models, the desired level of capital,
∗
t K , is determined by output, Yt: 
 
t t kY K =
*                   (1) 
 
where k is the capital coefficient (capital-output ratio)
17. For simplicity, we assume 
∗
t K  to 
be equal to actual capital, Kt. This means that net investments, It and  (Kt - Kt-1), are 
proportional to changes in the desired stock of capital, 
∗
−
∗ − 1 t t K K . Net investments, NIt, 
can be expressed in the following way:  
 
) ( 1 − − = t t t Y Y NI λ                 (2) 
                                                 
15  For  a  discussion  of  accelerator  models  of investment  and  review of  empirical  work,  see Jorgenson 
(1971). 
16 Value-added is defined as compensation to production factors and can be calculated in two ways: 1) 
Sales – costs for intermediary goods, 2) Profits + cost of labor. From an accounting perspective, sales are 
relatively unproblematic, whereas costs of intermediary goods and labor expenses are count differently 
across countries. For this reason, the two alternative calculations of value-added typically do not match.  
17  See  Kaldor’s  (1963)  famous  statement  that  this  capital-output  ratio  remains  approximately  constant 
overtime.         11 
 
In this formulation, net investments are proportional to an accelerator λ. If  t t K K =
∗  then 
λ = k. This is an equilibrium assumption which is typically not fulfilled, but this is not 
relevant for our purposes (see Jorgenson, 1971; Tinbergen 1938; 1939)
18.  
 
For gross investments, we add replacement investments which are proportional to old 
capital,  1 − t K δ . We obtain gross investments in this manner:  
 
t t t Y K I ∆ + = − λ δ 1                 (3) 
 
We divide both sides of equation 3 with Kt-1 to obtain: 
 











λ δ                   (4) 
 
Since  t t kY K =















λ δ                 (5) 
 
where λ
* = (λ/k), which is the elasticity of capital with respect to output (as reflected by 
sales). This is also useful for empirical applications because it achieves a normalization 
that reduces heteroskedasticity, which makes equation 4 possible to estimate empirically. 
Note that if  t t K K =
∗ in every point in time, then λ = k which means that λ
* = 1.  
 
We estimate the following equation for each country: 
 
                                                 
18 This assumption can be relaxed by using a flexible accelerator which allows for lags in the adjustment of 
the capital stock. However, using the simple accelerator as we do means that the coefficient will reflect 
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            (6) 
 
where 
∗ λ  is the elasticity of investments with respect to sales, I is investments made by 
firm i in period t, K is capital stock in period t-1 and S is sales in period t. Since we use 
panel  data  and  are  primarily  interested  in  country-specific  estimates  of  elasticity  of 
capital,  we  use  a  fixed  effects  model  with  firm  and  time  effects  (αi  and  θt)  for  all 
estimations of 
∗ λ . The time effects resolve possible cyclic trends of investments and the 
firm  effects  control  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  across  firms.  This  is  appropriate 
because  we  are  interested  in  country  averages,  and  previous  studies  show  that 
investments decisions are subject to market frictions. These are, in turn, affected by firm- 
and  industry-specific  attributes  (see  Hubbard,  1998;  Bjuggren,  Eklund  and  Wiberg, 
2007). 
 
We  consider  our  amendments  to  Wurgler  (2000)  appropriate  for  measuring  capital 
allocation at the firm level
19. 
 
4.  Data and methodology  
 
For  our purposes,  we  derive  new estimations  of  the  elasticity of  capital.  We  employ 
existing institutional measures. 
                                                 
19 The original method used by Wurgler (2000) to measure elasticity of investments is inconsistent with the 
accelerator  principle.  His  measure  of  the  elasticity  of  investments  with  respect  to  value  added,  η ,  is 
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where I and V are industry investments (gross fixed capital formation) and value added respectively. The 
subscripts denote industry, country and time respectively. Presumably he uses this approach for empirical 
reasons, since he uses aggregated industry data.  However, one may still expect a high correlation between 
η   and  λ
*.    For  the  elasticity  of  capital  to  be  equal  to  the  elasticity  of  investments,  it  is  necessary 
that: t t I K ∆ = ∆
∗ . This is the case only if  1 1 − − = t t K I δ which implies that: 1 1 −
∗
− = t t K K . For other alternative 
specifications of elasticity’s see Clements and Theil (1987).    13 
 
4.1. Elasticity of Capital 
To estimate the elasticity of capital, we use firm level accounting data on investments, 
capital stock and sales collected from Standard & Poor’s Compustat Global (see Table 1 
for sources and definitions of data). Gross investments are measured as: 
 
I = After tax profit – dividends + depreciation + ∆Equity + ∆Debt + R&D   
 
This  measure  of  investments  is  appropriate  because  it  adequately  reflects  actual 
investments,  which  other  accounting  measures  of  investments  do  not.  Using  gross 
investments is also more appropriate than using net investments because it is not possible 
to obtain reliable estimates for replacement investments. Arguably, other expenditures 
such as advertising and marketing should also be included in investments (Mueller and 
Reardon, 1993) but the data is typically not available consistently across countries. For 
this reason, we exclude it.  
 
The measure of capital is also selected to be consistent across countries. All financial 
firms are excluded from the sample since the nature of investments in these firms differs 
from non-financial firms. To adjust for differences in inflation, variables are adjusted to 
2000 constant prices, using inflation data from International Financial Statistics (IMF). A 
total  of  11984  firms  are  included,  corresponding  to  61292  observations.  In  order  to 
minimize  the  weight  of  possible  outliers,  observations  for  each  country  are  cut  five 
percent in each end of the distribution
20. Naturally, the usual accounting caveats apply. 
Estimated elasticity  s j' ˆ∗ λ  are reported in Table 3. We have grouped countries by legal 
origin as defined by La Porta et al. (2003).   
 
4.2. Institutional Measures 
                                                 
20 Trimming the data leads to a consistent definition of outliers and makes the results more robust. It is also 
possible  to  apply  some  sort  of  robust  estimation  technique,  such  as  median  regression  or  iteratively 
reweighed least squares. The results obtained using these techniques are essentially the same as with the 
simple trimmed OLS.      14 
In  order  to  test  the  primary  hypothesis,  we  select  several  indicators  on  institutional 
quality and ownership concentration. Definitions and sources are presented in Table 1. 
We use key institutional variables that have been identified in the literature. The property 
rights index is from Holmes, Johnson and Kirkpatrick (1997) and is also used by La Porta 
et al. (2003).  Anti-director or minority shareholder protection is measured by the Pagano 
and Volpin (2005) index, which is an extended and recoded version of the original index 
used by La Porta et al. (1998). This new version
21 covers the period 1993 to 2001, and we 
use the average for the entire period. 
 
As a measure of the quality of the legal system, we use the Law and order index from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), averaged over the period 1982 to 1995. This 
index was also used by La Porta et al. (1998). Essentially the index measures quality of 
property rights; the correlation between the two indexes is 0.74. We also add legal origins 
as  a  dummy  variable,  using  the  following  classification  (from  La  Porta  et  al.,  1999, 




For ownership concentration we use two country-level measures, constructed by La Porta 
et al. (1998): Mean and median of the three largest owners in the ten largest firms. They 
compute combined cash flow rights for the three largest owners in each firm.  In addition, 
we add two measures for family control of corporations, also compiled by La Porta et al. 
(1999). They measure family control as the share of the 20 largest firms in each country 
that  are  controlled  by  families.  Two  measures  are  constructed,  assuming  control  is 
inferred at the levels of 10 percent and 20 percent of ownership. In this case, ownership 
concentration is measured as control-rights and not cash-flow rights. This is appropriate 
considering that investment decisions are influenced by the level of control and not cash-
flow rights. In addition we have also included family data on Indonesia, the Philippines, 
                                                 
21 The new index is also called the LLSV Pagano-Volpin anti-director index. The index is based on a 
questionnaire sent to legal experts in each country included in the study conducted by Pagano and Volpin in 
2005.  
22 The legal origins hypothesis is now a dominant stream in the research on corporate governance (La Porta 
et al., 1999, 2003). Arguably, it is also important from an evolutionary perspective, depending on how 
path-dependency is treated in economic systems.   15 
Taiwan  and  Thailand  from  Claessens  et  al.  (2000).  We  recognize  the  problems  with 
measures of ownership concentration and family control in La Porta et al. (1998; 1999).  
For example, they are likely to underestimate concentration of control in some countries 
by not explicitly considering pyramidal ownership structures and cross-holdings. Another 
problem  is  that  these  measures  may  be biased  due to  differences  in  absolute  size  of 
corporations across countries (for a discussion, see La Porta et. al 1999). The measures 
may  for  example  reflect  the  fact  that  large  corporations  are  likely  to  have  less 
concentrated  ownership  simply  because  it  requires  more  capital,  all  else  equal  (see 
Kumar, Rajan and Zingales 1999). However, despite these problems we believe that these 
measures provide a reasonable approximation of the concentration of corporate control 
across countries.    
 
We also use standard controls for level of economic development and level of economic 
growth.  For  economic  development,  we  take  the  logarithm  of  1995  GDP  levels.  For 
economic growth, we use average GDP growth between 1980 and 2002. The GDP data 
was  collected  from  the  World  Development  Indicators.  Taiwan  is  missing  from  this 
dataset,  so  we  have  used  its  corresponding  value  from  La  Porta  et  al.  (1997).  See 
Appendix 2 for a correlation matrix of the variables.    16 
Table 1   Variables and data 
Investments, I  Defined as: I = after tax profit (IB) + depreciation (DP) – dividends (DVC) + 
∆Equity  (SSTK  less      PRSTKC)  +  ∆Debt  (∆DT)  +  R&D  (XRD).  Compustat 
Mnemonics: Measures within brackets. Data ranges from 1997 to 2005. Number 
of years differs across countries with not less than 6 years for any given country. 
Source: Standard and Poor, Compustat Global. 
 
Firm sales, S  Firm sales. Compustat Mnemonics: SALE. 
Source: Standard and Poor, Compustat Global. 
 
Firm capital, K   Defined as net cost or valuation of tangible fixed property used in the production 
of revenue. Compustat Mnemonics: PPENT
23. 




(mean and median) 
Measured as average percentage and median of shares (cash-flow rights) held by 
the three largest shareholders in the ten largest firms in each country. 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
 
Family control  
(10 and 20 percent) 
Measured  as  the  share  among  the  20  largest  firms  in  each  country  that  are 
controlled by families. If a family has control-rights above a certain level the 
firm is assumed under family control. Control is inferred at 10 and 20 percent of 
control-rights.  Data for 27  countries  is  from  La  Porta  et  al. (1999).  Data  for 
Indonesia,  Philippines,  Taiwan  and  Thailand  is  from  Claessens,  Djankov  and 
Lang (2000). Contol is also inferred at 10 and 20 percent, but data is for all 
available firms.  
Source: Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000); La Porta et al. (1999)  
 
Legal origin  Dummy  variable:  German,  French,  English  and  Scandinavian  and  Socialistic. 
The commercial code or Company law is used to identify legal origin. 
Source: La Porta et al (1998), Socialist/Communist origin (La Porta et al. 2003). 
 
Shareholder protection 
(Volpin-Pagano LLSV  
Index  of  Anti-director 
rights) 
 
Index ranges from 1 to 6.The index is a summary of: 1) proxy by mail allowed, 
2)  deposit  of  share  not  required  prior to shareholders  meeting,  3)  cumulative 
voting allowed, 4) oppressed minority mechanism, 5) less or equal 10 percent for 
calling  an  extraordinary  meeting,  6)  preemptive  rights.  The  index  is  Pagano-
Volpain updated and extended version of the La Porta et al. (1998) anti-director 
index. Pagano and Volpin (2005) extend the index to cover the period 1993-
2001. This is based on questionnaires sent to legal experts in each country (47). 




Index of quality of protection ranges from 1 to 5. 5 is strongest. 
Source: Holmes et al. (1997) 
  
Law and order  Measures country law and order tradition. 6 is strongest. Average for 1982-1995. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
 
Log GDP  The logarithm of GDP 1995. 
Source: World Development Indicators. (Taiwan from La Porta et al., 1997) 
 
Growth of GDP  Average of annual GDP growth rates between 1980-2002. 
Source: World Development Indicators. (Taiwan from La Porta et al., 1997) 
 
                                                 
23 This is a narrow definition of capital. An alternative is total assets (AT). PPENT is one component of AT. 
Accounting  methods  differ  more  with  respect  to  AT  than  PPENT,  the  treatment  of  intangible  assets. 
However, the correlation between these two alternatives is high so choosing one has a minor scaling effect.    17 
5.   Results 
 
We estimate average capital elasticity 
∗ λ ˆ  for each country (see Table 3). As a first step, 
we empirically evaluate the robustness of our model as compared to Wurgler (2000). The 
merit of our model is reflected in the correlations for our control variables (see Table 8). 
Current GDP is positively and significantly correlated in Wurgler’s measure (0.44) but 
not with our measure
24. Therefore, we suggest our measure is less sensitive to differences 
in level of economic development and is more robust for cross-country study. This is 
especially  meaningful,  given  major  differences  in  economic  development  across 
countries
25. Note that both measures show a negative significant relationship with GDP 
growth. When we regress Wurgler’s estimates for investment elasticity on our measure of 
capital elasticity, the resulting regression coefficient is close to one (see Appendix 3).  
 
Next, we test the legal origin hypothesis (La Porta et al., 1998) by regressing legal-origin 
dummies on our elasticity measure 
∗ λ ˆ . The all-country average 
∗ λ ˆ  is 0.98, which is not 
statistically different from an average of 1.0. We obtain the following averages based on 
legal  origin:  English  origin  is  0.81,  French  origin  is  0.84,  German  origin  is  1.10, 
Scandinavian origin is 1.53 and Communist/socialist origin is 0.74. Scandinavia is the 
only legal origin category which deviates significantly from the all-country average. It 
remains significant at 10 percent if the high elasticity of Norway is removed. Clearly, the 
within-legal origin variation is greater than the  between-origin variation. Our ranking 




                                                 
24 Marginal q is, in effect, another measure of the functional efficiency of capital markets, developed by 
Mueller and Reardon (1993). It measures the return on investments relative to the opportunity cost. We also 
compare our elasticity measure with the estimates of marginal q by Gugler, et al. (2004b). Somewhat 
surprisingly,  we  find  no  significant  correlation.  However,  marginal  q  is  significantly  correlated  with 
ownership concentration, property rights and shareholder protection (see Appendix 2).  
25 For example, Norway has the highest elasticity of capital (2.34), likely due to the expansion of the oil 
industry. We do not treat Norway as an outlier because our measure of elasticity of capital allocation is not 
sensitive to the level of economic development (current GDP) and we have no reason to believe that the 
results are due to any measurement errors.    18 
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Scandinavian   
 
 












2    0.23   
F-value    2.99   
No. observations    44   
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. The dependent variable 
is country specific capital elasticity and explanatory variables are legal origin dummies. The 
dummy  variables  have  been  constrained  to  sum  to  zero,  so  legal  origin  coefficients  are 




Table 3 contains estimations for equation 6 for each country. Again, it is a fixed effects 
model with firm and time effects. Separate country coefficients are reported in Table 3. 
Clearly,  the  within-group  variation  is  substantial.  In  fact,  only  Scandinavian  origin 
countries differ significantly from the all-country average when we regress legal-origin 
dummies on our measure of capital allocation (see Appendix 3). Further, we do not find 
any  significant  difference  between  common  (English  origin)  and  civil  law  (French, 
German and Scandinavian) countries (for detailed discussion see La Porta et al., 1999). 
 
We  also  find  that  weak  protection  of  private  property  in  combination  with  high 
concentration of ownership, in particular family ownership, hampers the (re)allocation of 
capital. The intuition is that, all else equal, low capital elasticity is reflective of high 
transaction  costs.  This  empirical  result  is  consistent  with  the  economic  entrenchment 
hypothesis,  which  has  important  implications  because  most  corporations  around  the 
world  have  at  least  one  controlling  owner  (La  Porta  et  al.,  1999).  This  is  typically 
achieved through mechanisms such as pyramid ownership and dual-class shares. This   19 
contradicts the Berle and Means (1932) notion of dispersed ownership. The importance 
of property rights is not surprising and supports the idea that ownership concentration can 
be leveraged as a substitute for protection when investors are inadequately protected (La 
Porta et al., 1998). For example, Mexico has 100 percent family ownership, a weak score 
of 3 on the property rights index and the weakest score of 1 for anti-director rights, so our 
estimate  of  capital  elasticity  is  fairly  low  at  0.715.  Indonesia  has  69  percent  family 
ownership, a weak score of 3 on the property rights index and a weak score of 2 on the 
anti-director rights index, and we estimate low capital elasticity at 0.342. 
 
We test the impact of minority shareholder protection, protection of property rights and 
law  and  order  on  ownership  (see  Table  4).  Interestingly,  shareholder  protection 
significantly reduces ownership concentration but has no significant impact on family 
ownership. Not surprisingly, current GDP has a significant negative effect on ownership 
concentration, but no significant effect on family ownership. GDP growth also has no 
effect on family ownership. 
 
We test the effect of our institutional variables and controls on our measure of elasticity 
of  capital  (see  Table  5).  We  repeat  the  regressions  with  and  without  legal  origin 
dummies. Without accounting for legal origin, the following variables are noteworthy: 
Property rights and law and order both have a positive and significant effect on elasticity 
of capital. When dummies for legal origins are included, these effects do not change. In 
fact, the results are strikingly similar: Without legal origin dummies, we get a result of 
0.237  (significant  at the  0.01  level)  for property  rights,  and  this  actually falls  to 0.2 
(significant at the 0.05 level) when we include legal origin dummies. Similarly, we see a 
positive significant effect of 0.164 (at the 0.01 level) for law and order without legal 
origin dummies, but this falls to 0.132 when included. 
 
The correlation matrix for all variables is in Table 8. Property rights and law and order 
have a positive and significant correlation (at the 5% level) with elasticity of investments, 
at 0.43 and 0.61 respectively. For the sake of model comparison, we have also included 
in Table 8 the original elasticity of industry investments with respect to industry value-  20 
added, as calculated by Wurgler (2000). The most interesting comparison between our 
measure  of  elasticity  of investments with  Wurgler’s measure of  elasticity  of  industry 
investments is the correlation with our control variables. GDP growth is significant and 
negatively correlated with both our measure (-0.34) and with Wurglers’s measure (-0.4). 
However, current GDP is positively and significantly correlated with Wurgler’s measure 
(0.44) but not with our measure. Again, this suggests that our measure is not sensitive to 
current level of economic development but is sensitive to changes (growth).   21 
Table 3   Capital Elasticities with respect to Sales, 
∗
j λ ˆ  
Country  ∗
j λ ˆ   t-value  Std. Err.  R

















Canada  0.849  15.0  0.057  0.14  303  1646  1999-2005 
Hong Kong  0.756  8.24  0.092  0.12  101  550  1999-2005 
India  0.687  13.6  0.051  0.17  169  912  1999-2005 
Ireland  1.464  6.99  0.210  0.26  33  178  1999-2005 
Israel  0.609  2.05  0.297  0.06  26  140  1999-2005 
Malaysia  0.400  16.4  0.024  0.15  524  2371  1999-2005 
New Zealand  0.829  3.02  0.275  0.07  52  234  2000-2005 
Pakistan  0.367  3.09  0.119  0.12  26  164  1998-2005 
Singapore  0.776  18.9  0.041  0.25  301  1363  2000-2005 
South Africa  1.064  6.26  0.170  0.09  114  512  2000-2005 
Thailand   0.523  9.91  0.053  0.13  217  1182  1999-2005 
United Kingdom  1.276  18.8  0.068  0.09  691  3774  1999-2005 
United States  1.160  42.5  0.027  0.16  2137  11642  1999-2005 






54.7  0.016  0.11  5071  26715  - 
Argentina  0.600  7.73  0.078  0.37  21  114  1999-2005 
Belgium  1.266  8.05  0.157  0.18  72  400  1999-2005 
Brazil   0.551  8.41  0.066  0.15  96  524  1999-2005 
Chile  0.431  7.96  0.054  0.20  80  438  1999-2005 
Colombia  0.283  1.88  0.151  0.13  10  54  1999-2005 
France  1.575  14.8  0.106  0.10  362  1976  1999-2005 
Greece  1.034  9.96  0.104  0.27  55  296  1999-2005 
Indonesia  0.342  4.92  0.069  0.07  170  764  1999-2005 
Italy  0.937  8.14  0.115  0.11  160  738  2000-2005 
Mexico  0.715  8.58  0.083  0.31  57  308  1999-2005 
The Netherlands  1.595  11.2  0.142  0.15  113  620  1999-2005 
Peru  0.675  8.89  0.075  0.44  18  123  1997-2005 
The Philippines  0.645  12.8  0.050  0.31  69  373  1999-2005 
Portugal  1.219  6.62  0.184  0.30  26  140  1999-2005 
Spain  0.942  11.8  0.080  0.25  76  410  1999-2005 
Turkey  0.567  2.53  0.224  0.06  29  156  1999-2005 






27.6  0.042  0.10  1414  7434  - 
Austria  1.167  7.47  0.156  0.25  43  248  1999-2005 
Germany  1.579  18.7  0.085  0.12  431  2344  1999-2005 
Japan  0.603  38.5  0.016  0.24  2860  13230  2000-2005 
South Korea   0.817  21.4  0.038  0.35  203  927  2000-2005 
Switzerland  0.946  12.6  0.075  0.21  142  782  1999-2005 
Taiwan  0.725  16.0  0.045  0.26  180  972  1999-2005 






48.6  0.023  0.13  3859  18503  - 
Denmark  0.977  7.08  0.138  0.12  86  470  1999-2005 
Finland  1.619  9.21  0.176  0.20  84  454  1999-2005 
Norway  2.340  5.38  0.435  0.07  89  404  2000-2005 
Sweden  1.177  6.91  0.170  0.05  173  961  1999-2005 






11.2  0.115  0.06  432  2289  - 
China  0.482  30.5  0.016  0.21  1130  6108  1999-2005 
Hungary  0.730  4.41  0.165  0.29  11  60  1999-2005 
Poland  1.331  5.88  0.227  0.29  19  119  1998-2005 
Russia  0.434  3.42  0.127  0.36  12  64  1999-2005 







31.2  0.016  0.20  1172  6351  - 
Average / total
a  0.914 
(0.902) 
 
77.5  0.012  0.10  11948  61292  - 
Note: Country categorization into legal origin follows La Porta et al. (2003). Elasticities are estimated with fixed effects model 
with firm and year effects.   
a These are weighted averages. Note that this gives different weights to countries. Simple averages  ∗
j λ ˆ are in brackets. 
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There are several possible explanations for a capital elasticity greater than one. First, 
indivisibilities of production factors may make the production function discontinuous, so 
output cannot be produced proportionally to capital. This is typically the case for firms 
with economies of scale in production. This may explain the high capital elasticity for 
Norway. During the sample period, Norwegian growth was strong and presumably driven 
by  the  expansion  of  the  oil  industry.  Second,  “excessive  expectations”  may  affect 
estimates of capital elasticity. If investors and managers have excessive expectations on 
returns to their investments, this can cause an elasticity larger than one. For example, 
Manne (1945) argues that the accelerator principle works differently at different stages of 
a business cycle, arguing that firms are more responsive to changes in output during 
periods of economic expansion. If this is the case, we might expect a positive relationship 
between capital elasticity and growth rates. However, our panel of firms has no less than 
six  annual  observations  for  any  country  and  we  use  a  fixed-effect  estimation,  which 
should control for possibly cyclical investment behavior.  Finally, an elasticity greater 
than one could arise from measurement error. If It or Kt contain measurement errors, this 
can  create  scaling  effects  so  estimated  capital  elasticity  deviates  from  its  true  value. 
However,  this  is  unlikely  to  be  a  problem  in  our  study  since  our  variables  were 
specifically defined to provide consistent estimation across countries. This is the reason 
we replace value-added with sales as our measure of output. Any measurement error will 
be consistent across all countries, since elasticity is a relative measure of the efficiency of 
capital allocation. Thus, our results are ultimately still unaffected. For example, we use a 
narrow measure of capital that includes only fixed tangible assets. This augments the 
measure of capital elasticity across all countries.  
 
Note that the elasticity of capital is only a measure of how efficiently capital is allocated 
between industries. It is not a direct measure of how effectively an economy channels 
capital to entrepreneurs and new ventures. However, it is safe to expect that if established 
firms allocate capital effectively, this is also reflective of access of entrepreneurs and new 
ventures  to  external  capital.  For  example,  Wurgler  (2000)  shows  that  highly  elastic 
investments are positively correlated with financial development.  
       23 
Before we can report the effects of ownership, private property and investor protection on 
capital allocation, further clarification is needed on the links between variables. In Table 
4  we  report  regressions  of  institutional  variables  on  ownership  measures.  As  noted 
previously, the dependent variables (ownership concentration and family control) were 
collected from La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) and Claessens et al. (2000). By and large, our 
results (see Table 4) replicate the results of La Porta et al. (1998, 1999). Not surprisingly, 
property rights and law and order are highly correlated (0.74). However, these indices are 
not significantly correlated with investor right protection. All three institutional variables 
have a negative effect on ownership concentration and the degree of family control. GDP 
has a negative effect on ownership concentration. This may be due to several factors. 
There may be reverse causality where high concentration of ownership reduces economic 
development. Growth  in  GDP  has  no  robust  effect  on  concentration  of  ownership  or 
family control. This suggests that it is not possible to use all the explanatory variables 
simultaneously when examining the effect on elasticity of capital. This would lead to 
serious multicollinearity. Keeping this in mind, we analyze the effect of these variables 
on capital elasticity. Results are reported in Table 5.  
 
Law and order and property rights improve capital elasticity. Ownership concentration 
and family control significantly reduce capital elasticity. This means that the quality of 
private property improves resources allocation whereas ownership reduces it. The results 
are robust for mean and median of ownership concentration, and family control is robust 
when control is inferred at 10 percent and at 20 percent. Shareholder protection does not 
have an effect on capital elasticity, other than through indirect effects on ownership, as 
reported in Table 4.    24 
 
   
  Table 4    Ownership Concentration and Corporate Governance  
  Dependent variable: Ownership concentration    Dependent variable: Family ownership 
  Mean ownership    Median ownership    Control inferred at 10%    Control inferred at 20% 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)    (7)  (8) 
Constant    196.0*** 
 (5.57) 
 




  225.0*** 
 (5.20) 
  255.8*** 
 (6.02) 
    187.2** 
 (2.63) 
  290.5*** 
 (3.87) 




Shareholder protection  - 2.90** 
 (- 2.03) 
 
- 3.07** 




 (- 2.03) 
- 3.82** 




 (- 1.67) 
- 2.80 
 (- 0.87) 
  - 6.13* 
 (- 1.87) 
- 4.42 
(- 1.31) 
Law and order  - 3.19*** 
 (- 2.73) 
 
    - 4.13*** 
 (- 2.87) 
    - 7.89** 
 (- 2.66) 
    - 9.75*** 
 (- 3.33) 
 
Property rights    - 7.53*** 





  - 10.16*** 
 (- 4.19) 
 
 
  - 19.81*** 
 (- 3.83) 
    - 21.08*** 
(- 3.91) 
Log GDP  - 10.44*** 
 (- 3.26) 
 
- 11.14*** 




 (- 3.16) 
- 13.18*** 




 (- 1.36) 
- 13.97** 
 (- 2.15) 
  - 7.81 
 (- 1.23) 
- 10.53 
(- 1.55) 








 (- 2.35) 
- 0.88 
 (- 0.73) 
 
 
  2.81* 
 (1.73) 
  2.11 
 (0.91) 





2  0.52  0.53    0.51  0.56    0.45  0.55    0.50  0.56 
No observations  40  39    40  39    31  30    31  30 
F-value  9.40  9.78    9.08  10.87    5.39  7.55    6.52  7.80 
VIF (mean)  1.13  1.13    1.13  1.13    1.09  1.22    1.09  1.22 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Dependent variables are ownership concentration (1 - 4) and family control 
(5 - 8) respectively. Explanatory variables are shareholder protection, law and order, property rights, GDP level and growth in GDP. Ordinary Least 
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Table 5   Allocation of capital, legal origin and ownership  
Dependent variable: Elasticity of capital,
∗
j λ ˆ  
  Regressions without legal origin dummies  Regressions with legal origin dummies 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 




 (- 0.10) 
  2.133 
 (1.16) 


















Shareholder protection  - 0.030 
 (- 0.59) 
 
- 0.033 
 (- 0.58) 




       
Law and order    0.164*** 
 (3.98) 
 
            0.132*** 
(2.72) 
         
Property rights      0.237*** 
 (2.85) 
 
            0.200** 
(2.15) 
       
Ownership 
concentration mean 
    - 0.013** 
 (- 2.18) 
 
            - 0.006 
(- 0.79) 
     
Ownership 
concentration median 
      - 0.012** 
 ( - 2.45) 
 
            - 0.006 
(- 1.13) 
   
Family ownership, 
control inferred at 10% 
        - 0.009** 
(- 2.66) 
 




control inferred at 20% 
          - 0.008** 
(- 2.58) 
 
            - 0.009*** 
(- 2.81) 
Log GDP  - 0.031 
 (- 0.27) 
 
  0.042 
 (0.33) 
- 0.028 
 (- 0.19) 
- 0.043 

















Growth GDP  - 0.046* 
 (- 1.69) 
 
- 0.096*** 
 (- 2.32) 
- 0.090*** 




















2  0.43  0.33  0.23  0.26  0.30  0.29    0.49  0.45  0.36  0.38  0.48  0.48 
No observations  40  39  40  40  31  31    40  39  40  40  31  31 
F-value  6.48  4.12  3.78  4.27  3.81  3.64    4.33  3.61  3.14  3.31  3.73  3.66 
VIF (mean)  1.13  1.13  1.42  1.38  1.20  1.17    1.75  1.71  1.81  1.75  1.55  1.52 
Note: *, ** and *** indicates significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Our dependent variable is the elasticity of capital with respect to sales (
∗
j λ ˆ ). 
Regressions 7 to 12 also include legal origin dummies. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) have been used as estimator.      26 
When  we  include  legal  origin  dummy  variables,  the  negative  effect  of  ownership 
concentration  becomes  insignificant  but  the  other  variables  remain  significant.  The 
results are robust even if our control variables, log GDP and GDP growth, are omitted. 
We  include  them  nonetheless  because  they  reveal  the  advantages  of  our  accelerator 
method. As one might expect, the existing level of economic development (measured as 
GDP)  has  no  impact  on  capital elasticity.  However,  economic  growth  (GDP  growth) 
significantly  reduces  capital  elasticity.  This  makes  sense  and  can  be  interpreted  with 
respect  to  the  dynamics  of  economic  growth:  The  pressure  for  structural  change  is 
reduced  as  growth  rates  increase.  Obviously  it  should  be  noted  that  the  direction  of 
causality between resource allocation and economic growth is ambiguous. 
 
Further research is needed in this area. One important question concerns the effect of 
control-enhancing  mechanisms  on  investment  behavior  at  the  firm  level.  A  second 
question  is  the  historic  development  of  corporate  governance  institutions,  and  how 
political  economy  conditions  have  made  them  endogenous  at  the  country  level.  For 
example, the extent to which property rights and investor protection are endogenous to 
ownership structure is still largely unresolved (see Morck et al., 2005).      27 
6.   Conclusions  
 
We examine the effect of ownership concentration and related market institutions on the 
allocation of capital in the economy. We measure capital elasticity for 44 countries with a 
panel of about 12,000 firms and 61,000 observations. We advance the literature in two 
ways. First, we make a methodological contribution using the accelerator principle of 
investments  to  derive  a  measure  of  the  efficiency  of  capital  allocation:  Elasticity  of 
capital with respect to output. The accelerator principle is applicable because if desired 
capital stock is proportional to output, changes in output will reflect changes in desired 
capital  stock.  We  measure  output  with  sales  to  achieve  consistent  estimates  across 
countries. Therefore, a low elasticity of capital with respect to sales is a sign of relatively 
high  capital  adjustment  costs.  This  measure  is  related  to  Wurgler’s  approach  at  the 
industry  level  (2000),  which  estimates  elasticity  of  investments  but  not  of  capital.  In 
contrast, our approach aligns with the accelerator principle. Our measure of elasticity 
requires firm level data for investments, capital stock and sales. This is a comprehensive 
definition of investments that reflects the actual cash available for managers to invest, 
thereby  reducing  problems  related  to  accounting  measures  of  investments.  All  three 
measures are selected to ensure consistent definition across countries. 
 
Second, we empirically test two streams currently dominating in the current research on 
corporate  governance  literature.  On  the  one  hand,  we  find  support  for  the  economic 
entrenchment hypothesis. On the other hand, our empirical results do not support the 
hypothesis that legal origin is a key determinant of growth. 
 
We  find  that  protection  of  private  property  is  important  for  capital  allocation.  The 
obvious  policy  implication  is  that  property  rights  should  be  strengthened  in  order  to 
improve capital allocation. This is consistent with the institutional approach to economic 
growth. However, we stress the importance of acknowledging the difference between 
enacting and enforcing institutions. For example, clauses may be written into law but 
poorly enforced or easily circumvented by informal institutions such as corruption. This 
is likely the case for India for example, where the highest value of 5 on the Volpin-  28 
Pagano-LLSV Anti-director rights index is countered by lower values of 2.5 for law and 
order  and  3  for  property  rights.  We  also  find  that  family  control  and  ownership 
concentration  negatively  influence  capital  allocation.  We  use  aggregate  ownership 
measures  collected  by  La  Porta  et  al.  (1998,  1999)  and  Claessens  et  al.  (2000). 
Economies  with  highly  concentrated  ownership  structures  display  clear  signs  of 
economic entrenchment and persistent misallocation of capital. We argue that it is not 
ownership concentration per se that creates inefficiencies in the allocation of capital but 
rather, the condition of its governing institutions. Therefore, strong private property and 
investor  protection  reduce  equilibrium  concentration  ownership  and  improve  the 
allocation of capital. Finally, legal origin has no significant impact on our measure of 
capital allocation.  
 
In  the  long  run,  strengthening  key  institutions  will  shift  the  equilibrium  towards 
maximum returns on investments because these improvements facilitate the movement of 
capital  to  more  productive  purposes.  This  has  significant  implications  for  policies 
designed  to  encourage  innovation  in  high-growth  industries,  not  least  because 
entrepreneurs require capital that would otherwise be tied up in other industries. Thus, we 
suggest  that  when  institutions  improve  the  allocation  of  capital,  firms  are  better 
positioned  for  innovation  and  growth.  This  translates  into  overall  better  economic 
performance.   29 
Appendix 1 
 
Table 6   Corporate Governance Indicators 
Country









(annual %)  Log GDP 
 
Australia  4  6.00  5  0.68  0.94  3.31  11.57 
Canada  5  6.00  5  0.58  1.16  2.72  11.76 
Hong Kong  5  4.93  5  0.95  0.78  5.38  11.15 
India  5  2.50  3  0.10  0.80  5.63  11.55 
Ireland  4  4.68  5  0.67  1.10  5.42  10.82 
Israel  3  2.89  4  0.26  1.27  4.19  10.95 
Malaysia  4  4.07  4  0.29  0.86  6.27  10.95 
New Zealand  4  6.00  5  0.90  0.86  2.45  10.78 
Pakistan  5  1.82  4  0.26  0.40  5.13  10.78 
Singapore  4  5.14  5  0.49  0.97  6.99  10.92 
South Africa  5  2.65  3  -  0.97  2.01  11.18 
Thailand   2  3.75  5  -  0.64  6.00  11.23 
United Kingdom  5  5.14  5  0.81  0.85  2.26  12.05 
United States  5  6.00  5  0.72  1.05  2.90  12.87 
English origin  
 
4.29  4.40  4.5  0.56  1.02  4.33  11.33 
Denmark  2  6.00  5  0.85  0.65  1.84  11.26 
Finland  3  6.00  5  0.56  0.96  2.60  11.11 
Norway  4  6.00  5  0.58  1.04  3.12  11.17 
Sweden  3  6.00  4  0.85  0.65  2.02  11.40 
Scandinavian origin  
 
3  6.00  4.8  0.71  0.78  2.40  11.24 
Austria  2  6.00  5  0.84  0.71  2.26  11.37 
Germany  1  5.54  5  0.99  0.57  1.94  12.39 
Japan  4  5.39  5  0.82  0.86  2.57  12.72 
South Korea   2  3.21  5  0.65  0.70  6.81  11.69 
Switzerland  2  6.00  5  -  0.64  1.52  11.49 
Taiwan  3  5.11  -  -  1.26  11.56  12.34 
German origin  
 
2.33  5.21  5  0.83  0.74  4.44  12.00 
Argentina  4  6.00  5  -  0.78  3.31  11.57 
Belgium  0  6.00  5  0.80  0.51  2.08  11.44 
Brazil   3  3.79  3  -  0.25  2.42  11.85 
Chile  5  4.21  5  0.29  1.24  5.13  10.81 
Colombia  3  1.25  3  0.13  0.43  2.98  10.97 
France  3  5.39  4  0.89  0.57  2.11  12.19 
Greece  2  3.71  4  0.64  0.54  1.71  11.07 
Indonesia  2  2.39  3  0.22  0.84  5.40  11.31 
Italy  1  5.00  4  0.65  0.64  1.93  12.04 
Mexico  1  3.21  3  0.34  0.50  2.77  11.46 
The Netherlands  2  6.00  5  0.57  0.69  2.37  11.62 
Peru  3  1.50  3  0.65  0.11  1.90  10.73 
The Philippines  3  1.64  4  0.31  1.00  2.67  10.87 
Portugal  3  5.21  4  0.54  0.46  2.95  11.03 
Spain  4  4.68  4  0.87  0.54  2.75  11.77 
Turkey  2  3.11  4  0.24  0.52  3.79  11.23 
French origin 
 
2.56  3.94  3.9  0.51  0.59  2.89  11.37 
China  -  -  -  -  0.45  9.48  11.85 
Hungary  -  -  -  -  -  1.19  10.65 
Poland  -  -  -  -  -  -  11.04 
Russia  -  -  -  -  -  -  11.60 
Socialist/communist origin 
 
-  -  -  -  -  5.52  11.29 
Average / total  3  4.43  4  0.65  0.75  3.61  11.42 
Note:   j η ˆ is the elasticity of industry investments with respect to industry value-added, as estimated and reported by Wurgler  (2000). 
Marginal q are estimates of the return on investments, i, relative the cost of capital, r (qm = i/r). The estimates of marginal q have been 
collected from Gugler et al. (2004b). Both Wurgler (2000) and Gugler et al. (2004b) report estimates for more countries than are 
included in our sample.  See text and Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 7   Measure of Ownership Concentration  
Country
a  Family ownership 
(control inferred at 10%) 
Family ownership 
(control inferred at 20%) 
Ownership 
mean (3 largest) 
Ownership 
median (3 largest) 
 
Australia    10    5  28  28 
Canada    30    25  40  24 
Hong Kong    70    70  54  54 
India    -    -  40  43 
Ireland    15    10  39  36 
Israel    50    50  51  55 
Malaysia    -    -  54  52 
New Zealand    45    25  48  51 
Pakistan    -    -  37  41 
Singapore    45    30  49  53 
South Africa    -    -  52  52 
Thailand     57    62  47  48 
United Kingdom    5    0  19  15 
United States    20    20  20  12 
English origin  
 
  35    30  41  40 
Denmark    35    35  45  40 
Finland    10    10  37  34 
Norway    25    25  36  31 
Sweden    55    45  28  28 
Scandinavian origin  
 
  31    29  37  33 
Austria    15    15  58  51 
Germany    10    10  48  50 
Japan    10    5  18  13 
South Korea     35    20  23  20 
Switzerland    40    30  41  48 
Taiwan    66    48  18  14 
German origin  
 
  29    21  34  33 
Argentina    65    65  28  28 
Belgium    50    50  54  62 
Brazil     -    -  57  63 
Chile    -    -  45  38 
Colombia    -    -  63  68 
France    20    20  34  24 
Greece    65    50  67  68 
Indonesia    69    72  58  62 
Italy    20    15  58  60 
Mexico    100    100  64  67 
The Netherlands    20    20  39  31 
Peru    -    -  56  57 
The Philippines    42    45  57  51 
Portugal    50    45  52  59 
Spain    25    15  51  50 
Turkey    -    -  59  58 
French origin 
 
  48    45  53  53 
China    -    -  -  - 
Hungary    -    -  -  - 
Poland    -    -  -  - 
Russia    -    -  -  - 
Socialist/communist origin 
 
-    -  -  - 
Average / total  38    33  45  44 
Note: Data on family ownership is from La Porta et al. (1999). Data for Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand is from 
Claessens et al. (2000). Data on ownership concentration is from La Porta et al. (1998). For descriptions see text and Table 1. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table 8  Correlation Matrix 
  ∗
























j λ ˆ  
  
  1                     
Ownership (mean)  - 0.27    1                   
Ownership (median)  - 0.32    0.96    1                 
Family ownership (10%)  - 0.48*    0.53*    0.59*    1               
Family ownership (20%)  - 0.49*    0.54*    0.57*    0.95*    1             
Property rights    0.43*  - 0.51*  - 0.55  - 0.60*  - 0.61*    1           
shareholder protection  - 0.20  - 0.21  - 0.20  - 0.30  - 0.29  - 0.10    1         
Law and order    0.61*  - 0.44*  - 0.46*  - 0.54*  - 0.61*    0.74*  - 0.17    1       
Log GDP    0.16  - 0.54*  - 0.54*  - 0.34  - 0.38*    0.19  - 0.02    0.41*    1     
GDP growth  - 0.34*  - 0.26  - 0.22    0.27    0.30    0.17    0.10  - 0.17    0.03    1   
Marginal q, qm     0.12  - 0.40*  - 0.47*  - 0.19  - 0.17    0.44*    0.33*    0.24    0.28    0.28    1 
j η ˆ     0.53*  - 0.32  - 0.34  - 0.38  - 0.50*    0.59*  - 0.03    0.71*    0.44*  - 0.48*  - 0.13 
Note: * indicates significance at 5 percent. j η ˆ is the elasticity of industry investments with respect to industry value added estimated by Wurgler  (2000). Marginal q are estimates 













Table 10   Elasticity  of  capital,  elasticity  of 
investments and marginal q  
Explanatory variables:          Dependent variable: 
∗
j λ ˆ  













2  0.28  0.01 
No. observations  34  44 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. In this table our 
measure  of  capital  allocation  is  compared  with  Wurgler  (2000)  measure  of  investment 
elasticity ( j η ˆ ), and Gugler et al. (2004) marginal q (qm j). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is 
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